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A B S T R A C T
In this paper, we aim to contribute to the literature on post-growth futures. Modern imaginings of the future are
constrained by the assumptions of growth-based capitalism. To escape these assumptions we turn to utopian
fiction. We explore depictions of work in Cokaygne, a utopian tradition dating back to the 12th century, and
William Morris's 19th century News from Nowhere. Cokaygne is a land of excessive consumption without work,
while in News from Nowhere work is the route to the good life. These competing notions provide inspiration for a
post-growth vision of work. We argue that biophysical and social dynamics mean that in a post-growth economy
we are likely to have to be less productive and work more. But, this can be a utopian vision. By breaking the link
between work and consumption at the level of the individual, we can remove some of the coercion in work. This
would free us to do jobs that contribute to the social good, rather than generate exchange value, and empower us
to fight for good work. Finally, we draw on eco-feminist analyses of capitalism to argue that by challenging
labour productivity growth we can also challenge wider forces of oppression.
1. Introduction
To achieve sustainable societies we are likely to have to move be-
yond growth based economies. Historically, economic growth has been
coupled with environmental impact. It is extremely unlikely that we
will be able to decouple one from the other (Hickel and Kallis, 2019;
Jackson and Victor, 2019). There are a number of dynamics that drive
the growth-environment coupling. One key example is that the socio-
economic structures that incentivise resource efficiency gains also in-
centivise using those gains to fuel further growth in production. Under
such dynamics, efficiency gains ultimately drive up resource use
(Jackson, 2017; Mair, 2019; Sakai et al., 2019). Addressing this and
other drivers of growth will have major implications for how we live. In
this paper we take the issue of work as a case in point.
1.1. Work beyond growth?
Currently, work is bound up with growth dynamics. Take, for ex-
ample, the ‘productivity trap’ (Jackson and Victor, 2011). To reduce their
costs, grow profits and break into new markets, firms attempt to increase
labour productivity. The net result of labour productivity growth is that
fewer people are needed to produce the same amount of goods. This
means that without growth people are made unemployed. Under the
political economy of growth-based capitalism, unemployment means a
loss of social status and only limited access to the material goods of life.
Consequently, the political economy of work in wealthy capitalist
economies puts pressure on all of us to support growth.
A second example is the way that work is organised to support
growth. When economists and politicians speak of growth they are
usually discussing increases in ‘real’ GDP (Kallis, 2017). GDP is pri-
marily designed as a way to measure and understand market activity
(European Comission et al., 2008). Consequently when our economies
are organised to drive growth, this results in the expansion of markets
and market work – often at the expense of non-market forms of work
(Dengler and Strunk, 2017). Feminists and ecological economists have
for a long time argued that endless pursuit of market growth degrades
other forms of work, notably ‘reproductive’ work. This is the work done
by nature, and that done in the commons and in the household. This
work is essential to the reproduction of society but is rarely rewarded
financially. It is not coincidental that the forms of work that are de-
graded are those that came to be associated with women in the Middle
Ages (Federici, 2014; Saunders and Dalziel, 2017).
Ecological economists have put forward two key ideas for how work
might function in a post-growth or degrowth economy. 1) Reducing the
number of hours worked and 2) reducing the amount of goods and
services produced for each hour worked. In other words, we can reduce
working hours (Hayden, 1999; Jackson and Victor, 2011; Victor, 2012;
Dengler and Strunk, 2017; Zwickla et al., 2016). We can stop, reverse,
or slowdown labour productivity growth (Jackson and Victor, 2011;
Nørgård, 2013; Ferguson, 2016; Jackson, 2017). Or we can do both.
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In this paper we bring a new perspective to these debates. We use an
exploration of depictions of work in historical utopian fiction as the basis
for a discussion of work in post-growth futures. We argue that the most
fruitful focus for research, policy, and activism towards post-growth fu-
tures is to challenge the dynamic of labour productivity growth.
1.2. The value of utopian thought
We turn to utopian fiction because we believe that a central chal-
lenge of post-growth economics is the difficulty of finding appropriate
models in today's economic structures, which are dependent on growth.
Utopian fiction is a valuable resource for critically rethinking socio-
economic structures and drawing inspiration for new ecologically
sound and socially just post-growth economic futures.
Utopian fiction in particular, and literary analysis more generally,
has been underused by ecological economists. However, there are a few
notable exceptions that point to the possibilities that utopian fiction
opens up for ecological economics.
Kallis and March (2015) use the anarchist society described in Le
Guin's (1974/1987) The Dispossessed to explore the political appeal and
purpose of the degrowth concept. Other ecological economists have
pointed to the utopian impulse of ecological economics (Martinez-Alier,
1992; Ingebrigtsen and Jakobsen, 2012). Recent contributions from
Foster (2017) and Levitas (2017) engage with utopian fiction and pick
up themes familiar to ecological economists. Foster uses William Mor-
ris's News from Nowhere to discuss possibilities for work in a sustainable
future. Levitas argues for the potential of utopian fiction to help us
envisage the radical social change required for a ‘sustainable pros-
perity’. In this paper we aim to build on these works and show how
utopian fiction can be a useful part of the ecological economics toolkit.
We aim to show that utopian fiction can be used to expand our
collective economic imaginations. Fictional narratives have ethical
impacts on readers, changing how they engage with the world
(Gregory, 1998; Johns-Putra, 2016). Utopian fiction in particular pro-
vides a critical distance from today's problems, encouraging us to view
how we live now in the light of how we might live tomorrow (Levitas,
2017). These qualities are essential for developing a forward-looking
ecological economics.
We live under a form of ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher, 2009) – the
collective belief that there is no way to organise social relations other
than those we see under capitalism. Under such conditions the utopian
act of imagining a future, with different social institutions, is itself a
form of resistance and struggle (Davies, 2018). Yet it is one that is
extremely hard to do – more often than not, future visions are either
apocalyptic, or based on technological, rather than social, innovation
(Slaughter, 2004). By virtue of being written at different points in time,
historical utopian fiction has the advantage of distance from the apoc-
alyptic and tech fuelled economic imaginaries that permeate our ev-
eryday experiences. In this way it enables us to achieve critical distance
from today's economy. This is essential for constructing post-growth
economic theory which must be radically different from the economics
we live with day-to-day.
We treat historical utopian fiction as analogous to economic theory.
Historian of economic thought Warren Samuels argues that economic
models and utopian novels are similar in form. Both tell a “story not
about actual economies but of an abstracted rational reconstruction”
(Samuels, 2003, p. 204). And, like models, utopias are often explicitly
informed by economic thinking. For example, utopian author Kim
Stanley Robinson's recent work was informed by green and ecological
economists including: Hazel Henderson, Herman Daly and E.F. Schu-
macher (Robinson, 2016). Here we seek to uncover these economic
elements in the work of William Morris, and in the utopian tradition of
Cokaygne. Like studying the history of economic thought or inter-
rogating an economic model, bringing the economic ideas embodied in
historical utopian fiction into conversation with modern insights can be
a useful way of developing new economic theory.
1.3. Aims and contribution
In this paper we ask what a positive future of work could look like in
a post-growth society. To this end we focus on visions of work in two
contrasting utopias. First, we explore a variety of interpretations of the
depiction of work in the Cokaygnian tradition of folk utopias.
Cokaygnian tales span the 12th and 21st centuries and are all set in a
land of plenty where work is forbidden. We then explore the concept of
work in News from Nowhere, a late 19th century English utopia written
by the socialist and romantic William Morris. In contrast to Cokaygne,
News from Nowhere makes work a central route to the good life. Finally,
we bring the ideas of Cokaygne and News from Nowhere into con-
versation with insights from ecological and feminist economics. On this
basis we sketch our own ideas on the role of work in a post-growth
economy.
Our vision of a post-growth future is one in which we work more,
but radically differently: we are less ‘productive’. We argue that this is
necessary because labour productivity growth is a dynamic that is
symbiotic with growth and degradation of the environment.
Consequently, a move to a post-growth economy must also be a move to
a low labour productivity growth economy. However, this symbiosis
also means that labour productivity growth is also implicated in over
production, and the degradation of work. By removing coercive market
forces we can improve working conditions and reduce levels of pro-
duction by freeing people to work in socially useful ways. Drawing on
eco-feminist analysis, we then show that labour productivity growth is
implicated in patriarchal oppression. Therefore, challenging labour
productivity growth will allow the post-growth movement to build a
broad-based coalition of interests against growth based capitalism and
towards greater equality and happier lives.
2. Cokaygne: utopia without work?
Cokaygne1 is the setting for a long tradition of folk utopias, a fan-
tastical land of plenty where people feast on self-roasting geese and
sleep all day. Cokaygne is well known in the utopian literature, but has
received little attention in ecological economics or futures studies. Here
we introduce readers to the tradition and a selection of its varying in-
terpretations. The multiple interpretations of the Cokaygnian tradition
demonstrate the richness of utopian writing on the economics of work.
The Cokaygnian tradition peaked in popularity in 12-16th century
Europe (Lochrie, 2016). One of the earliest surviving Cokaygnian
manuscripts is the French poem ‘De Cocaingne’, written as a perfor-
mance piece in 1250. De Cocaingne (reprinted in Parsons, 2015) es-
tablishes numerous tropes that are characteristic of later Cokaygnes.
These include linking idleness to monetary reward, and animals that
cook themselves. Slightly later comes ‘The Land of Cokaygne’, a Middle
English poem written in Ireland around 1300 (reprinted in Millett,
2003). ‘The Land of Cokaygne’ takes the imagery of De Cocaingne and
sets it in the context of a monastery. An example of Cokaygne from later
in this period (1567) is ‘The Land of Cockaigne’, a painting by the
Flemish artist Pieter Bruegel the Elder (Fig. 1).
The Cokaygnian tradition survives in more modern cultures.
Perhaps the most established modern Cokaygne is The Big Rock Candy
Mountains,2 a folk song describing a hobo's3 paradise, a land filled with
cigarette trees and whisky lakes. The song was brought to prominence
1We use an English term Cokaygne throughout this paper. In French it is
Cocaingne, or Cucagna; in Spanish Jauja; German Schlaraffenland; and in Dutch
Luilekkerland (Lochrie, 2016). There are variations on the spelling of these
terms and other names outside of Europe.
2 Harry MClintock's polite version can be heard at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=JqowmHgxVJQ and is reprinted in Raulerson (2013).
3 Here Hobo is the name for a North-American subculture defined by a
transient nature and a commitment to work. See Raulerson (2011).
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in 1928 by the singer Harry McClintock, but was written in 1905 based
on earlier oral traditions (Raulerson, 2013).
The thread connecting all Cokaygnian tales is a land where the link
between labour and production has disappeared. For example, in De
Cocaingne, “the more you sleep the more you earn” (Parsons, 2015 lines
26–28). Alternatively, The Big Rock Candy Mountains does away with
the means of production: “there are no short-handled shovels, no axes,
spades or picks”. Presumably these were disposed of when the residents
“hung the jerk/That invented work” (Raulerson, 2013 Verse 3 lines 6–7).
But the lack of workers and means of production does not mean that
Cokaygne is a place of material restraint.
Cokaygne is a land where everything is produced without labour
and consumption is spectacular. In Medieval Cokaygnes it is common to
find rivers, lakes and streams “Of oil and milk, honey and wine” (Millett,
2003 line 46). More modern Cokaygnes have “lemonade springs… And a
gin lake too.” (Raulerson, 2013 verse 1 line 6 and verse 4 line 6). So it is
unsurprising that we don't find dairy farmers or distillers. Likewise, in
Cokaygne there are no cooks, but they aren't missed because the ani-
mals of Cokaygne prepare themselves to be eaten. De Cocaingne has “Fat
geese, turning/All by themselves, and fully ready” (Parsons, 2015, lines
38–39) and Bruegel's The Land of Cockaigne features a roast pig walking
around with a knife strapped to its side. Similarly, the preparation of
places to feast happens with no servants in sight. For example, in De
Cocaingne (Parsons, 2015, lines 41–44),
“…at all times
In the streets and in the lanes
You find tables already laid
And spread over with white cloths”
In short, Cokaygne is a land where no-one ever appears to work but
where everyone consumes extravagantly.
2.1. Between utopia and moral instruction
Cokaygne's extravagant consumption most likely started life as a
satirical take on paradise myths. Manuel and Manuel (1979) and Kumar
(1991) argue that the roots of Cokaygne are in satirical mockings of the
Ancient Greek myth of the Golden Age. Medieval Cokaygnes mock the
relative poverty of the Judaeo-Christian paradise. For example, The
Land of Cokaygne (Millett, 2003, lines 5–8) opens with:
“Though Paradise is fair and bright,
Cockaygne is a finer sight.”
The poet then goes on to contrast the sparseness of heaven, with the
luxury of Cokaygne (Millett, 2003, lines 9–17):
“Though paradisal joys are sweet,
There's nothing there but fruit to eat;
No bench, no chamber, and no hall,
No alcoholic drink at all.”
The poet continues this comparison at some length, finally con-
cluding that “Cockaygne offers better fare” than heaven.
Cokaygne's extravagance has also been used to satirise excessive
consumption. For Lochrie (2016), Cokaygne started life as a utopia, but
become increasingly moralised as the Middle Ages progressed. By the
time of Bruegel's painting (Fig. 1), Lochrie argues that Cokaygne has
ceased to be a utopia. Rather, Bruegel's lifeless figures warn us away
from Cokaygne's life of excess. For Parsons (2015) this narrative is only
partially correct. Cokaygne hasn't become a moral lesson, it has always
been a moral lesson. Discussing De Cocaingne (written three centuries
prior to Bruegel's painting), Parsons notes that two out of the three
original manuscripts are found alongside poems that have moral intent.
Based on this and what he terms its “grotesque imagery” (p. 173), Par-
sons concludes that Cokaygne “is in essence an exercise in reductio ad
absurdum, taking the belief that happiness can be attained in the material
world to its most ridiculous possible extreme in order to direct its reader
towards more spiritual ends” (p. 180).
However, this view is far from settled – where Parsons sees gro-
tesquery, others see a ‘carnival spirit’ (Kendrick, 2004). In this view,
rather than being a warning to avoid a life of materialism and leisure,
Cokaygne is seen as depicting a desirable life. This utopian reading sees
Cokaygne's combination of fantasy and comedy as expressions of desire
that overwhelm any moral intent. There is some contextual evidence to
support this idea: one early copy of De Cocaingne is introduced as and
included alongside several French ‘fabliaux’, known for their obscene
humour (Parsons, 2015; Lochrie, 2016). However, the utopian case for
Cokaygne is more usually based on its imagery and content.
Most authors who see a utopia in Cokaygne do not argue against its
satirical intent, but maintain that this is undermined by the use of rich
imagery and appealing central concept. For example, Kumar (1991)
argues that Cokaygne ends up looking like a drunken feast of the type
Fig. 1. The Land of Cockaigne, Pieter Bruegel, 1567. Image Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a5/Pieter_Bruegel_d._%C3%84._037.jpg.
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enjoyed by medieval peasants. Manuel and Manuel (1979, p. 79) sug-
gest that this comes about because the writers of Cokaygne are too close
to their audience to “dismiss their vulgar aspirations with philosophical
contempt”. The result is that even if Cokaygne started life as a cau-
tionary tale of excess, its writers got so caught up in the imagery that
things “quickly got out of hand, and the satire was swallowed up in the
Utopia” (Morton, 1969, p. 17).
2.2. Cokaygne as a critique of inequality
The utopian reading of Cokaygne is facilitated by the assumption
that the Cokaygnian audience are those who have worked long hours
and lived in material poverty. In this vein, Cokaygne is seen as the
utopia of “those at the bottom of the social hierarchy” (Sargent, 2015, p.
21). The idea here is that utopias are an expression of desire for a better
way of living. Therefore, a utopian vision is one free from the struggles
that most plague its audience.
From this perspective, Cokaygne – the land of abundance and
idleness – makes sense as a utopia for those who are burdened with
arduous work and poverty. Following this logic, Medieval Cokaygnes
are often thought of as the utopia of peasant farmers (Levitas, 1990;
Pleij, 2001). In the USA, the Cokaygnian tradition is thought to belong
to various poverty-stricken groups: African-American slave commu-
nities, Native Americans (after colonisation), and the unemployed of
the Great Depression (Sargent, 2015). Cokaygne makes sense as utopia
for these groups because “for people who were constantly hungry, with
little or no chance of earning money to buy food, and dependent on hand-
outs, these images [of Cokaygne] have an obvious appeal” (Sargent, 2015,
p. 32). Because of this basis in appealing imagery, the Cokaygnian
utopia has been interpreted as a naïve compensatory fantasy (Parsons,
2015; Lochrie, 2016).
However, the view that Cokaygne's audience is primarily the over-
worked and marginalised poor lends itself to a more critical utopian
reading. This interpretation does not dispute the base pleasures of
Cokaygne's materialism or idleness, but it argues that alongside this is a
critique of inequality and injustice (Morton, 1969; Kendrick, 2004;
Lochrie, 2016). In contrast to the real world, in Cokaygne people have
everything they need regardless of their wealth or status. For example,
The Land of Cokaygne states that “All is common to young and old/To
strong and stern, to meek and bold.” (Millett, 2003, lines 63–64). Simi-
larly, in De Cocaingne (Parsons, 2015, lines 45–56):
“You can drink, and eat as well,
As much as you want with no problem,
With no challenge, and no refusal.
Nor does anyone have to pay the bill
After he eats, for no–one keeps count.”
The explicit recognition in this passage that consumption has
nothing to do with the ability to pay, can be seen as a critique of the
way that actually existing economies of the time distributed goods in
ways that excluded the poor. This interpretation roots Cokaygne's
utopianism in a critique of economic inequality.
A central element of the critical utopian reading of Cokaygne is the
way it takes the lifestyle of the aristocracy and makes it available to the
poor. Lochrie (2016) interprets the way that Cokaygne disrupts the
work-production relationship as redistribution, taking the lifestyles of
the wealthy and making them available to all. From this perspective, De
Cocaingne's maxim ‘the more you sleep, the more you earn’ can be seen
as a reflection of the lives of medieval European aristocracy writ large.
In Medieval Europe, almost all economic surplus was taken from pea-
sant farmers by the aristocratic class (Milanovic et al., 2010). By con-
trast, in Cokaygne everybody has access to material comfort.
Some authors go a step further, arguing that rather than distributing
goods to everybody, Cokaygne distributes goods only to the poor.
Morton (1969) argues that rich people cannot access Cokaygne. Sargent
(2015) makes the same point, noting that in several Cokaygnian texts,
to get to Cokaygne the traveller has to endure trials that reflect ev-
eryday experiences of peasants but are alien to the aristocracy. To get to
The Land of Cokaygne, for instance, a “Gentlemen, well-bred and kind”
(Millett, 2003 line 183) must spend seven years wading “through pigshit
to his chin” (Millett, 2003 line 181). For Morton (1969, p. 24), the
meaning of such imagery “is clear enough: the land of Cokaygne is, like the
Kingdom of Heaven, harder for a rich man to enter than for a camel to go
through the eye of a needle.”
2.3. Cokaygne as a sham utopia
Finally, it is useful to turn to an interpretation of Cokaygne which
serves to connect the critical utopia and the moral lesson. Cokaygne as a
moral lesson points to the emptiness of Cokaygne's lifestyle. Cokaygne
as a social critique highlights the way that Cokaygne inverts existing
economic relationships to make consumption more widely available.
The final interpretation we raise here is also based on a critique of
economic relationships but is more critical of Cokaygne's lifestyle than
the utopian reading.
The central relation in the ‘sham’ interpretation of Cokaygne is
exploitation. This is particularly clear in some versions of The Big Rock
Candy Mountains which bookend the verses about the wonders of
Cokaygne with interactions between an older ‘jocker’ and younger
‘punk’. These interactions reframe Cokaygne as a lie told by the older
man in order to convince the younger man to join him on the road
(Raulerson, 2013). Eventually the punk refuses:
“I've hiked and hiked till my feet are sore,
I'll be God damned if I hike any more,
To be buggered sore, like a hobo's whore,
In the Big Rock Candy Mountains.”
Raulerson (2013) argues that as well as highlighting exploitative
sexual politics that can be found in hobo culture, these additional verses
support a wider political intent from McClintock. McClintock was a
member of the revolutionary global union the Industrial Workers of the
World. In the versions of Cokaygne with the additional verses, Co-
kaygne represents the lie told by the employer class to workers. There is
no Cokaygne, at least not for the working class. This is a perpetual lie, a
false promise designed to keep workers in line. The punk's retort re-
presents the working class becoming aware of their oppression and
refusing to go along with the lie of Cokaygne.
2.4. Leaving Cokaygne
We are not arguing here for one or other of these interpretations as
correct. Nor is our discussion here comprehensive – there are other
interpretations of Cokaygnian tales. Texts take on a life of their own,
and are always ambiguous in their meaning. In part this is the useful-
ness of Cokaygne specifically and utopian studies more generally.
Reading various Cokaygnes and seeing how they are interpreted by
others gives us an insight into multiple possible understandings of
work. Engaging with multiple interpretations gives us space to reflect
on work in the here and now. In Section 4 we will reflect on some of the
themes of Cokaygne in the light of our understanding of today's
economy. But first we turn to another utopia with an altogether dif-
ferent depiction of work.
3. News from nowhere - work as prosperity?
Written by William Morris, News from Nowhere is a late 19th century
utopia. Morris takes us into ‘Nowhere’ through the eyes of ‘William
Guest’, who one-day finds himself in a post-revolutionary England.
Guest tours this strange new land and finds that communist revolution
has transformed England into a classless, stateless and moneyless utopia
populated by artisans. Unlike Cokaygne, News from Nowhere is rela-
tively well known in sustainability circles (e.g. Miller, 2011; Foster,
S. Mair, et al. Ecological Economics 173 (2020) 106653
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2017).While the previous sections served primarily to introduce an
unfamiliar utopian tradition and the multitude of ways its view of work
can be interpreted, in this section we demonstrate how engaging with
the economic thought embodied in utopian fiction can provide a basis
for new economic theorising. To this end we present our account of the
economic thought underpinning the depiction of work in News from
Nowhere.
At the heart of News from Nowhere is a theory of work as key to
human wellbeing – a position re-emphasised recently in relation to
prosperity (Jackson, 2017; Foster, 2017). Throughout his travels in
Nowhere, Guest meets people engaged in various forms of work
(mending roads, studying mathematics, blowing glass). Although much
of this work has instrumental value, people undertake it primarily be-
cause they derive something from the work itself. This is most explicitly
illustrated in an exchange between Guest and ‘Hammond’ (a resident of
Nowhere),
“‘how do you get people to work when there is no reward of labour,
and especially how do you get them to work strenuously?’
‘No reward of labour?’ said Hammond, gravely. ‘The reward of labour is
life. Is that not enough?’”
(Morris, 1890b emphasis in original)4
Hammond goes on to tell Guest that people work in Nowhere in
order to create, and the reward of creation is “the wages which God gets”
(Morris, 1890b). Through this and other interactions we learn that in
Nowhere people find meaning through their work. However, Morris's
theory of work in News from Nowhere should not be read as an en-
dorsement of the reality of work in the 19th century.
In fact, the theory of work as prosperity is one of the most utopian
elements of News from Nowhere. Morris saw most work in late 19th
century England as “useless toil” characterised by a lack of pleasure
(Morris, 1884b). Morris believed that capitalist dynamics made work
bad by pushing the division of labour (that is, the simplification of
tasks, and specialisation of workers) to its extreme, and through the
production of unnecessary goods. Consequently, in News from Nowhere
the economy is reimagined: there is no consumerism, and production is
motivated by art and need rather than profit.
3.1. Morris on the division of labour
Morris's principle argument against the division of labour is that it
takes creativity and variety out of work. This argument draws heavily
on his mentor John Ruskin's belief that the division of labour improved
productivity by taking thought out of work:
“You can teach a man to draw a straight line, and to cut one; to
strike a curved line, and to carve it; and to copy and carve any
number of given lines or forms, with admirable speed and perfect
precision; and you find his work perfect of its kind: but if you ask
him to think about any of those forms, to consider if he cannot find
any better in his own head, he stops; his execution becomes hesi-
tating; he thinks, and ten to one he thinks wrong; ten to one he
makes a mistake in the first touch he gives to his work as a thinking
being.”
(Ruskin, 1853/2009, p. 161)
For Ruskin, thought is not only the process by which we make
mistakes in work, it is also the process which makes us human.
Consequently, he argues that a loss of productivity from less specialised
labour organisation is justified because when you give a worker the
freedom to think, you make “a man of him … He was only a machine
before, an animated tool” (p. 161).
Morris's interpretation of Ruskin was that work would be good when
made so creative that it became art (Kinna, 2010). In the preface to an
1892 reprint of Ruskin's The Nature of Gothic, Morris (1892) wrote: “the
lesson which Ruskin here teaches us is that art is the expression of man's
pleasure in labour”. In his own writing, Morris argues that ‘art’ is not
restricted to “pictures, statues, and so forth, but has been and should be a
part of all labour in some form or other” (Morris, 1888). In News from
Nowhere, Morris realises this ideal: in Nowhere, there is no longer a
word for art “because it has become a necessary part of the labour of every
man who produces” (Morris, 1890b).
To enable the condition of art as work in Nowhere, Morris limits the
division of labour. Residents of Nowhere are artisans who move between
occupations as they please (Kinna, 2000). Early in News from Nowhere,
we are introduced to this idea through Bob “a weaver from Yorkshire,
who has rather overdone himself between his weaving and his mathematics”
because both are “indoor work” (Morris, 1890b). Consequently, Bob has
decided to spend time working as ferryman: outdoor work. But despite
having the freedom to practice multiple occupations, the residents of
Nowhere are not self-sufficient and there is still a substantial division of
labour. Bob cannot survive on rowing, weaving, and mathematics
alone: some people are engaged in cooking, cleaning and growing food.
Consequently, Morris is not describing a complete removal of the di-
vision of labour. Rather he is advocating what he sees as the ideal level
of the division of labour, closely modelled on his view of medieval
artisans (Breton, 2002). This limits the division of labour to a level
which allows substantial variety and creativity in work.
3.2. Over-production and over-work
It is worth comparing Morris's views on the division of labour with
those of Adam Smith. Though Smith had reservations about its social
effects, he believed that the division of labour was necessary to increase
material wealth. Book I of the Wealth of Nations is largely concerned
with the benefits of the division of labour for economic growth. In the
opening lines Smith (1776)5 argues that “the greatest improvement in the
productive powers of labour … seem to have been the effects of the division
of labour”. The fundamental difference between Morris and Smith is
that where the latter sees a need for increased levels of production
Morris believes that 19th Century England is over-producing.
In much of Morris's writing he is railing against the wastefulness of
an emergent consumer capitalism. Consumer capitalism is an economic
system that seeks growth and profits by attempting to subsume all other
wants into the desire for new and immediate pleasures that lack wider
social value (Fisher, 2009; Jackson, 2017). We see these themes in
Morris's writing. For example, Morris thought that the profit motive had
led to most production being socially useless (Kinna, 2000). Speaking to
Leicester Secular Society in 1884, Morris argued that in order to get and
maintain profits, capitalists must sell a “mountain of rubbish…things
which everybody knows are of no use”. In order to create demand for
these useless goods, capitalists stirred up:
“a strange feverish desire for petty excitement, the outward token of
which is known by the conventional name of fashion—a strange monster
born of the vacancy of the lives of rich people”.
(Morris, 1884a)
By contrast, in Nowhere, nobody makes goods “on the chance of their
being wanted; for there is no longer any one who can be compelled to buy
them. … Nothing can be made except for genuine use” (Morris, 1890b).
Morris never uses the term, but his description of a production system
driven by the consumption of novel goods in a vain attempt to foster
personal wellbeing parallels modern understandings of consumer ca-
pitalism.
4 We are using the versions of Morris's writings made freely available by the
Marxists Internet Archive. They do not have page numbers.
5 As with Morris, we are using the version of The Wealth of Nations made
available by the Marxist Internet Archive. Consequently there are no page
numbers.
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3.3. How Morris limits the division of labour
To understand how Morris limits the division of labour in News from
Nowhere, it is useful to look at his historical analysis of the transition
from feudal society to industrial capitalism. In large part, Morris's
analysis falls under ‘traditional commercialisation’ accounts, where the
transition from feudalism to capitalism is the result of the expansion of
market forces (Wood, 2002). For example, Morris (1890b) argues that
in the early Medieval period “Capitalism does not exist”, because “there is
no great all-embracing world-market; production is for the supply of the
neighbourhood, and only the surplus of it ever goes a dozen miles from the
door of the worker”. This changes with the rise of a “commercialism” and
a turn to “foreign commerce” (Morris and Hyndman, 1884; Morris,
1890a). Morris argues that the quest for profit and the rapid expansion
of overseas markets was a key driver of the privatisation of commonly
held land. As markets expanded, “the landed nobility… so got hold of the
lands and used their produce, not for the livelihood of themselves and their
retainers, but for profit” (Morris, 1890a). For Morris, this rapid expansion
of markets and the giving over of land to the production of goods for
profit was the key to the rise of industrial capitalism and the extreme
division of labour.
Specifically, Morris believed that market expansion led to the
breakdown of the artisan guilds, and it was this breakdown that enabled
a greater division of labour. On the one hand, the displacement of
peasants from their land meant that “the towns were flooded by crowds of
the new free labourers” (Morris, 1890a) who would provide the larger
workforce required to split production into smaller, more specialised
stages. Simultaneously, Morris argued that the rapid expansion of the
world market required an increase in production levels, which meant a
“wider organisation of labour was needed, and, therefore, … a more and
more regulated division of labour, supplanted the old handicraft.” (Morris
and Hyndman, 1884). For Morris, these processes were complete and a
global market established by the 18th century.
The key consequence of the transition to a global capitalist system
for Morris was that it established labour as a resource. This is outlined
through Hammond in News from Nowhere, who says that under the
World-Market:
“it became impossible … to look upon labour and its results from
any other point of view than one - to wit, the ceaseless endeavour to
expend the least possible amount of labour on any article made.”
(Morris, 1890b)
For Morris, this is the final and most fundamental consequence of
the expansion of markets: the re-conceptualisation of labour into a form
of economic capital to be squeezed through the extreme division of
labour. This historical analysis frames the solutions that Morris pro-
poses in News from Nowhere.
In order to limit the division of labour in Nowhere, Morris scales
back of the geographical scope of production, and removes market
exchange altogether. Hammond tells Guest:
“men make for their neighbours' use as if they were making for
themselves, not for a vague market of which they know nothing; and
over which they have no control… [and] there is no buying and
selling”
(Morris, 1890b)
In short, having identified the expansion of markets as the ultimate
degrader of working conditions, Morris does away with them altogether
in News from Nowhere. Under Morris's historical analysis, there can be
no profit if there is no exchange, and there is no need to gain pro-
ductivity if there is no pressure to supply an expanding world market.
So, by getting rid of these mechanisms, Morris removes what he sees as
the key drivers of the extreme division of labour. In doing so he at-
tempts to create the conditions under which work can become art, and
useless production disappears.
4. The post-growth utopia: let's be less productive6
Our vision of a post-growth utopia is one with more work, not less.
We see a post-growth future as being more dependent on a greater
quantity of human labour in order to function. Reducing the energy and
material throughput of society and living more satisfying and mean-
ingful lives requires us to work more but differently. Inspired by the
visions of work we find in both Morris and some interpretations of
Cokaygne we believe that a world with more but better work can not
only be utopian in the best sense of the word but can provide a platform
from which to agitate for a post-growth society.
The key to creating a post-growth utopia lies in addressing the issue
of labour productivity growth. Labour productivity growth is im-
plicated in the violation of biophysical limits, the degradation of work,
the generation of inequality, and the devaluing of reproductive work.
Tackling labour productivity growth enables us to transition to a world
of less environmental damage, and stronger social bonds.
4.1. In a post-growth economy, productivity growth must fall
Labour productivity growth is an endogenous dynamic of fossil-ca-
pitalism. Labour productivity growth has historically had a symbiotic
relationship with capitalist markets and fossil-energy. Economic his-
tories locate the transition to fossil fuels as a key dynamic in the tran-
sition from a low productivity to a high productivity economy. The low
labour productivity period is characterised by the use of wood and
water, the high labour productivity period by fossil fuels (Wrigley,
2016; Malm, 2016). Fossil fuels were a dense energy store that greatly
improved the productivity of other economic processes (Hall and
Klitgaard, 2012; Smil, 2017). But fossil fuels alone are not enough to
drive growth. China had widespread coal use in its economy at the time
the industrial revolution started in Britain. However, Britain's labour
productivity and growth rapidly expanded in the 1700's while China's
remained steady (Broadberry et al., 2018).
The explanation for this is in the difference of the social structures of
Britain and China at the time. Coal in China:
“did not create new social needs, did not constantly push the borders of
its own market outwards...proto-industrialisation and economic growth
were remarkable achievements but failed to generate an accelerated di-
vision of labour.”
(Debeir et al., 1991)
On the other hand, in Britain, the consolidation of a new set of social
relations meant that the energy of fossil fuels was used to create new
markets and restructure the organisation of labour to make it more
productive. This can be interpreted in Marxian terms as fossil fuels
being used as a tool of social control by the capitalist class (Malm,
2016), or in liberal terms as the result of new institutions and cultural
attitudes that afforded social status to entrepreneurs (McCloskey,
2010). Either way, labour productivity growth has historically been
bound up with both the use of highly dense energy sources, and the
dynamics of capitalist markets.
Because of the way that productivity growth emerges from fossil-
capitalism, it is hard to disentangle productivity growth from the
overproduction that drives ecological crises. The endogenous view of
productivity growth that we propose here suggests that productivity
growth emerges from the same dynamics that drive endless economic
expansion. This is not to say that labour productivity growth is a ne-
cessary consequence of economic growth. Rather, the dynamics that
enable economic growth are a necessary (but not sufficient) pre-con-
dition for labour productivity growth.
6 The subtitle for this section was taken from an article in the New York
Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/27/opinion/sunday/lets-be-less-
productive.html
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Both work sharing and reduced productivity proposals threaten to
disrupt key dynamics of capitalist economies in ways that may also act
to prevent future productivity growth. Both cases seek greater redis-
tribution of surplus and less production. This will reduce profits.
Capitalist markets are competitive environments which encourage
producers to re-invest their profits in ways that reduce their costs and
increase their sales. This is necessary for survival on the micro-level –
firms have to be profitable to survive. A corollary of this is that pro-
ductivity gains are necessary for the survival of the macro-economy as
we know it. Firms without profits eventually stop investing, triggering
economic collapse (Gordon and Rosenthal, 2003; Binswanger, 2009).
This story sees productivity growth as emerging from the concentration
of wealth and in the pursuit of over production. Consequently, even
those work sharing proposals that do not see a need for productivity
growth reductions (e.g. Schor, 2015) may end up leading to declining
or stagnating productivity growth. But this is not the only reason to
focus on productivity dynamics. We also face another, more bio-phy-
sical, threat to productivity growth.
Fossil-capitalism has been able to generate enormous productivity
growth because fossil fuels have high energy return on energy invested
(EROI). EROI is a measure of energy quality. It is a ratio of energy
outputs to energy inputs. Fossil fuels have been able to drive pro-
ductivity growth because we have to invest relatively few resources to
get large amounts of energy out of them.
We may be entering an era in which the quality of available energy
sources is declining. Though the science is not yet settled, we appear to
be on the edge of a precipitous decline in EROI values (Rye and
Jackson, 2018; Brockway et al., 2019). Estimates suggest EROI has been
declining over time as energy production shifts to more unconventional
sources (Hall et al., 2014; Jackson, 2019). Renewables are also thought
to have low EROI, especially when issues such as intermittency are
addressed (Victor and Sers, 2019). It is possible that in the near future
EROI could reach such low levels that the energy sector effectively
‘cannibalises’ other sectors (Sers and Victor, 2018). That is, it is possible
that EROI could fall so low that in order to maintain the levels of energy
use we see today, we have to put so much energy and other economic
resources into energy generation that the resources available to be used
in other economic activities will be severely reduced. If this happens, a
reduction in overall productivity levels is likely to be forced upon us
(Elkomy et al., 2019).
Whether we run up against physical limits, or we successfully
transform our societies such that they are more equal and no longer
built around chasing output growth, we are likely to continue to face
falling productivity growth. In either case, we must be prepared to work
more. Can this be a utopian vision?
4.2. Free from the threat of hunger: working more, but working better
Both Cokaygne and News from Nowhere offer inspiration as to how
working more could be utopian. Specifically, both can be read in such a
way as to see them as being about the social conditions around work
rather than work itself.
The key dynamic that could make work utopian is the removal of
coercive forces. We see this in both Cokaygne and News from Nowhere.
In both utopias, no-one can be forced to work because they have access
to everything they need. Cokaygne achieves this with recourse to the
supernatural, breaking the link between labour and consumption alto-
gether. Though unrealistic, this serves an important lesson drawing our
attention to the freedom that comes with material security. News from
Nowhere achieves the same freedom but in a more promising way. In
News from Nowhere, there is still a link between work and consumption
– but this link is at the societal rather than the individual level. In News
from Nowhere, each worker produces not to secure their own material
conditions, but instead as part of a collective effort to construct a so-
ciety capable of providing for all its inhabitants. On the surface,
Cokaygne and News From Nowhere are very different. But they share at
least one key attribute: those who do not work, do not sacrifice their
ability to meet their material needs.
By removing the threat of material loss from any individual worker
if they do not work, we weaken the coercive powers that force people
into work. This is why some feminist and other radical scholars have
called for a universal basic income (e.g. Weeks, 2011; Srnicek and
Williams, 2015). They argue that a universal basic income hands power
to workers by allowing them to refuse work they do not want to do. For
this reason, a universal basic income has been characterised as a ‘uto-
pian demand’, capable of destablilising the capitalism (Weeks, 2011).
This comes about because a genuinely universal basic income creates
the security for individuals to refuse work.
Removing the coercive forces that push people into work will ben-
efit individuals and society as a whole. Without having to fear losing
our access to material goods, we will be free refuse work with condi-
tions that we do not like. We will be free to demand better working
conditions and to form new ways of working. At the societal level, re-
moving coercion will also help put a stop to the over production that
threatens to take us beyond biophysical limits.
A lack of coercion creates the conditions under which we are free to
refuse work that serves no social purpose. People working in jobs they
believe to be socially useless often express unhappiness and a desire to
work more usefully (Graeber, 2018). Conversely, people working in
undeniably useful jobs – such as nursing – often put up with very low
material reward and unpleasant working conditions. This is because
they are primarily motivated by the knowledge that they are per-
forming a socially useful task (Folbre and Smith, 2017). Unfortunately
many of these people are eventually forced out of such jobs by their
material conditions (Morgan et al., 2013). This suggests that if people
are free to choose, they are likely to choose work they believe is socially
useful. Moreover, it suggests that people will choose this work even if
that it is commonly believed to be challenging, difficult or simply un-
enjoyable (as is often the case with care work).
Much work in modern Western society is something we are coerced
into doing in order to secure our individual material conditions.
Removing coercive forces enables workers to safely and securely refuse
work, creating the conditions for a radical reimagining of work as
something done out of a desire to contribute to the social good.
4.3. Challenging productivity, challenging the master subject of capitalism
So far we have discussed the removal of coercion via a separation
between work and consumption at the level of the individual. This is
effectively the removal of the coercion associated with markets.
However, not all forms of coercion are purely market based. The gen-
dered nature of work is largely ignored in both the utopias we have
discussed. Both lack substantive discussion of reproductive work: care
work and housework. This work is not free from coercion simply be-
cause it resists market reasoning (Weeks, 2011; Dengler and Strunk,
2017). Non-market work also emerges from a history of violent coer-
cion (Federici, 2014). While not purely market driven, however, the
market and productivity are implicated in these other forms of coer-
cion.
Feminism offers us an analytical framework with which to under-
stand the interlinked nature of coercion in market work, coercion in
non-market work, and the origin of environmental crises. Using a
feminist framework we can locate productivity as a part of the op-
pressive force of growth based capitalism, and outline the ways it is
implicated in patriarchal as well as capitalist forces of oppression.
One key idea for thinking through the implications of labour pro-
ductivity is the ‘master subject’ of capitalism. Introduced by Hartstock
(1990) and Haraway (1991), and elaborated by Plumwood (1993a,
1993b) the master subject of capitalism is a logic of domination that sits
at the heart of capitalism. One of the reasons it is so difficult to escape
capitalist structures in our thinking is because our thinking has been
colonised by the ways of knowing that gave us capitalism (Ruder and
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Sanniti, 2019). This domination of our thought is ‘the master subject of
capitalism’ and it confines our ways of knowing to a limited and specific
form, while presenting itself as objective and universal (Haraway,
1991).
The perspective of the master subject relies on a logic system based
on false dualities (Plumwood, 1993b). The core duality is the associa-
tion of ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ with the master subject (who is human,
masculine, white and western), while nature, animality and emotion
are associated with the other (who is inhuman, feminine, of colour, and
non-western). In this way, Plumwood argues, nature and the feminine
are bound up together and seen as less valuable, less than human. While
there are many aspects to this dualism, here we focus on production vs.
reproduction, a key feature of the concept of labour productivity.
The master subject of capitalism privileges certain forms of work
and production while backgrounding and delegitimising others. The
transition to capitalism, as Morris recognised, is marked by production
for the market, rather than for use (Wood, 2002). In this way, capitalist
production separates work for ‘production’ from work for ‘reproduc-
tion’. This separation is unique to capitalism (Federici, 2014). The se-
paration of productive and reproductive work enables a distinction to
be made between market work which is termed ‘valuable’ and work
carried out by nature and in the household which is not considered
valuable. The feminization of nature is older than capitalism. For ex-
ample, in Ancient Greek mythology, the earth is feminised as a ‘mother’
and the heavens masculinised as a ‘father’ (Hamilton, 1942). But it is
under capitalism that ‘feminine’ reproductive work becomes effectively
valueless.
Federici (2014) provides the relevant historical context for this
framing, arguing that the development of capitalism required not only
the division of labour in terms of work-tasks, but also in terms of
gender. Prior to the complete takeover of market-based production,
Federici argues that work for production and work for reproduction
were not understood as separate and the work itself was not gendered.
Rather, as all work was in aid of supporting the household, it was
participated in by both men and women. In addition, although gen-
dered discrimination did take place, women's dependence on men was
limited by the fact that they had access to resources held in common –
principally land. Capitalist social relations developed by excluding
women from waged work. Federici sees land enclosures as a relatively
minor part of the development of capitalism and is critical of theories
that place large emphasis on them. However, she does note that land
enclosures meant the loss of non-market subsistence for women. Many
men lost access to land, but they gained access to the women who were
now dependent on them. As a result: “women themselves became the
commons, as their work was defined as a natural resource, laying outside the
sphere of market relations” (Federici, 2014, p. 97).
The systematic devaluation of feminised non-market work is found
throughout the history of labour productivity. Histories of productivity
often refer to Adam Smith's notion of productive and unproductive la-
bour (Bleischwitz, 2001; Abbott, 2018). While Smith (1776) does not
explicitly deal in gendered terms he is clear that ‘productive’ labour is
that which directly supports the accumulation of wealth – either by
producing material goods or by producing goods that can be sold. On
the other hand, unproductive labour is that which supports main-
tenance of the household – reproductive labour (Blaug, 1990). As Smith
writes in the opening lines of Book 2 Chapter 3 of The Wealth of Nations:
“The labour of a manufacturer adds, generally, to the value of the
materials which he works upon, that of his own maintenance, and of
his master's profit. The labour of a menial servant, on the contrary,
adds to the value of nothing.”
This way of thinking remains codified in the national accounts
today, which exclude inputs to production from nature and the
household (Waring, 1988; European Comission et al., 2008; Saunders
and Dalziel, 2017). Labour productivity (conventionally measured as
market output divided by hours worked in the labour market) is
intimately linked to the dominating logics of capitalism.
By challenging the value of labour productivity, we therefore
challenge a powerful part of the master subject of capitalism. Power
(2004) argues that the proper starting point for economic analysis
should be as a system of social provisioning: the way in which societies
organise to meet their collective needs. Similarly, Weeks (2011) argues
that we must reclaim the economy by directing it away from generating
profit to generating the conditions to support life. From these per-
spectives, what matters is not how much market value is created for
how little resources, but how well society is able to care for all its in-
habitants. This stands in stark opposition to the working of modern
labour productivity chasing economies, where people are forced to
work jobs they believe to be useless, or to leave jobs they believe to be
useful because of a need to access the market to maintain their liveli-
hoods (Druckman and Mair, 2019). We have already argued that the
removal of coercion may lead to more care work being done, because
this work is socially useful. Note that care work resists the market
mentality, more often than not being the preserve of the public and
charitable sector. Note also that care is a profession that requires
emotional as well as ‘rational’ intelligence (Druckman and Mair, 2019).
In these ways, the removal of coercion challenges the master subject by
challenging productivity.
4.4. Work without coercion may be less productive
Removing the threat of coercion may reduce labour productivity
growth. Though it originally came from the abstract notion of the
production of ‘value’, productivity has become synonymous with the
production of market value (Foster, 2016; Abbott, 2018). A useful post-
growth project may be to reject the current notion of productivity, ar-
guing instead that we should care about life rather than exchange value.
The proliferation of ‘bullshit jobs’ suggests that socially useful work will
not coincide with market work (Graeber, 2018). At the very least, the
experience of the health and care sectors suggests socially useful work is
unlikely to coincide with the most profitable forms of market work
(Druckman and Mair, 2019). A reduction in market activity could drive
a reduction in labour productivity growth.
Moreover, improvements in working conditions may also reduce
productivity growth. Economists have believed since Adam Smith that
measures that improve productivity can have negative impacts on
workers. Although he believed it necessary to increase material pro-
duction, Smith (1776) himself thought that highly specialised labour
would degrade our capacities for moral and mental reasoning. And, as
we have seen, Morris and Ruskin believed specialised work to be de-
humanising. Modern sociological accounts of work argue that au-
tonomy is key to good work – the ability to have control over what and
how we do our work (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011). Specialisation
and the division of labour limit this. Consequently, it is unlikely that
free people would consent to work in highly specialised roles and thus
would be less productive.
Finally, as a strategy that challenges the master subject of capit-
alism, freeing workers from coercion is a challenge to the very idea of
productivity. The modern notion of productivity is hard to understand
outside a market context. The frameworks we use for measuring pro-
ductivity do not work in non-market contexts (Diewert, 2018). What
may develop in its place is unclear. But it is unlikely to follow the dy-
namics we see today.
4.5. Towards an ecological utopia?
Removing coercive forces and overthrowing the productivity drive
leaves us with questions not adequately answered by Cokaygne, or
News from Nowhere. Namely, how do we decide what to produce, how it
should be produced, and how do we get there?
These questions return us to old debates around socialist calcula-
tion, but with new elements introduced by the frame of environmental
S. Mair, et al. Ecological Economics 173 (2020) 106653
8
limits. The socialist calculation debates revolve around the possibility
of determining the collective economic needs in the absence of capi-
talist markets, and specific mechanisms for doing so. On the one hand,
the fact that we have likely already crossed some planetary boundaries
(Steffen et al., 2015) shows us the deep problems that come with
leaving production decisions to markets. But this does not mean that we
should endorse central planning. When the socialist calculation debate
is occasionally revisited, it is sometimes noted that we now have much
increased computing power with which to approach socialist calcula-
tion (e.g. Srnicek and Williams, 2015). This notion has also been ex-
plored in utopian fiction (e.g. Le Guin, 1974/1987). But while it may be
possible to use algorithms to determine how many goods people want,
acknowledging environmental limits to production provokes a more
radical question. In this case, we must decide not only what to produce
but when to stop. Environmental limits mean that we have to decide
what not to produce. This is not a question that can legitimately be left
to a machine. Rather, it requires debate and deliberation (O'Neill, 2002;
Hammond, 2019). The question of what and how to produce are nor-
mative, not technical, questions.
The need for democratic apparatus in work is highlighted in fem-
inist works. One example of this is Weeks's (2011) life centred economy.
One of Weeks's primary concerns is that many forms of work happen
outside the market economy. So it is not sufficient to get rid of the
market and assume that a) the distribution problem will solve itself and
b) that we will be free from compulsive forces. Rather we must con-
struct new ways of working and being that are free from coercion. This
raises the distributive question of how we as a society decide how much
of our resources go into these new structures. Morris ducks this issue by
assuming that in localised economies people's needs are immediate and
obvious. It is not clear that this is actually the case, particularly when
we consider an expanded understanding of work from the feminist
perspectives of social provisioning or the reproduction of life.
In this context it is also useful to recognise that we are dealing with
multiple intersecting systems of oppression. The forces that compel us
into work are not only capitalist, they are also patriarchal. The dis-
cussion of feminist work in Section 4.3 highlights that the development
of capitalist markets went hand in hand with the degradation of
working and daily life for women. We must also be aware that many
men actively participated in the degradation of life for women. This was
partly as a way to retain their own power as it was diminished by the
expansion of markets. Indeed in Federici's (2014) account of the de-
velopment of capitalism this was the intended outcome: proto-capitalist
states deflected antagonism between the classes into an antagonism
between genders.
This has practical insights for how we organise a post-growth so-
ciety. On the one hand we must seek to rebuild broad-based class
support (Collard and Dempsey, 2018; Ruder and Sanniti, 2019). This
means recognising that growth-based capitalism seeks and maintains
growth by creating differences within classes (Collard and Dempsey,
2018). Our response to this must be to build what Fraser (2019) calls
‘progressive populism’. This requires building an inclusive politics that
recognises power differentials within classes and couples this with a
radically egalitarian economic vision. We must also be aware that if this
vision threatens existing economic and social power structures, it will
be actively opposed – as it has been since before the emergence of ca-
pitalism (Federici, 2014). Building this kind of broad-based support can
be done by recognising that the drivers of both social and ecological
challenges have shared roots.
Based on the above analysis we suggest that a post-growth move-
ment centered on challenging the productivity growth dynamics would
be well positioned to build such a broad base of support. Labour pro-
ductivity growth has its roots in capitalist practices that degrade work,
the environment and gender equality. It therefore offers us a new front
on which to struggle and begin to build broad based class solidarity.
Work in a post-growth utopia should combine an understanding of
work as a means of social provisioning with the view that the economy
must be materially restricted. This allows us to build away from a
system of labour productivity growth predicated on capitalist and pa-
triarchal oppression and towards a life centred economy built on a
democratic basis. In a life centred economy, work becomes something
we do to create meaning (as in Morris) but also something we do to
produce collective goods and collective freedoms (as in Weeks). In this
way we can understand the problem of the economy not as a calculable
question of how we produce the things we want, but as a normative
question of what we want to produce and how we want to do it. In this
view the utopian demand is for an economy in which we can all ne-
gotiate a meaningful life.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have explored utopian ideas of work, using an
analysis of depictions of work in the Cokaygnian tradition and in News
from Nowhere. Cokaygne is a fanciful land where labour has been taken
out of the production process: so no-one ever works. But whether this is
a utopian or a dystopian lesson is disputed. For those who see Cokaygne
as a moral lesson its imagery is a caricature of consumption and reveals
the emptiness of a life without work. On the other hand, the utopian
interpretation of Cokaygne points to the hardships endured by the
presumed audiences of Cokaygne. Utopian readers suggest that what
was intended as a moral lesson could look like a utopian dream to
overworked and poverty stricken peasants. Some interpretations of
Cokaygne go further, taking Cokaygne out of the realm of fantasy by
grounding it in a critique of economic inequality. This perspective
views Cokaygne as the ultimate land of redistribution – a land where
everyone lives like the 1%.
News from Nowhere differs from Cokaygne in that it sees work as the
proper route to fulfillment. Morris, following Ruskin, argued that work
could be meaningful and creative, and News from Nowhere is his attempt
to set out a society in which work fulfills these roles. However, News
from Nowhere and the utopian reading of Cokaygne are not entirely at
odds. Both recognise that in the real world, work can be painful. Where
they differ is in their solutions to this problem. Morris understands that
although there is pain in work, work is also valuable in personal and
social terms. Consequently he focuses his utopia on transforming work
into something good.
Drawing inspiration from Cokaygne and News from Nowhere we
sketched the outline of work in a post-growth utopia. The key to this
vision is that we work more rather than less, but we work less pro-
ductively. We argued that this was necessary for both biophysical rea-
sons, and because all proposals for work in post-growth economies are
likely to reduce productivity growth. However, Cokaygne and News
from Nowhere both share dynamics that enable us to see how more work
could be made utopian. In both utopias, a key coercive element is re-
moved. People can no longer be forced to work because their individual
consumption is not dependent on their individual production.
Removing coercion, such as through something like a universal
basic income, is likely to reduce productivity growth. As a result, it
could contribute to ending over production, improve working condi-
tions, challenging the master subject of capitalism and the patriarchy.
We pointed to evidence suggesting that workers desire socially useful
jobs but remain locked in jobs that do not fulfil this criterion due to the
threat of losing their livelihoods. We further argued that the concept of
productivity is implicated in Plumwood's (1993b) master subject of
capitalism: it is bound up in the human-nature duality by its adherence
to ‘production’ over ‘reproduction’. Removing the coercive forces that
push workers into market work challenges this story. Moreover, by
giving workers the ability to refuse work that is useless or in bad con-
ditions, removing coercive forces is likely to undermine productivity
and the very idea of productivity itself. In these ways working more
comes to be seen as part of a project for a better, more equal world with
an economy more in line with the feminist notion of social provisioning.
However, achieving this means engaging with questions left open by
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the utopian literature around how we as a society decide how to pro-
duce the means of daily life.
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